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Summary findings
Standard benefit-incidence analysis assumes that the  *  The wealthy value private education more than the
subsidy and quality of education services are the same for  poor  do.
all income deciles. This strong assumption tends to  *  Differences in school quality are greater at the
minimize the distributional inequity at various education  primary level.
levels.  In other words, wealthy households get the lion's share
Using a new approach emphasizing marginal  of benefits from public spending on education.
willingness to pay for education, Lopez-Acevedo and  Household  school enrollment and transition to the
Salinas analyze the impact of public spending on the  next level of schooling depend heavily on the cost of
education spending behavior of the average household.  schooling, how far the head of the household went in
They address several questions: What would an  school, the per capita household income, and the
average household with a given set of characteristics be  housing facilities or services. But the government's  effort
willing to spend on an individual child with given traits if  also affects the probability of enrollment  and transition.
subsidized public education facilities were unavailable?  The probability of enrollment  is much higher for the
What would the household have saved by sending the  40 percent of higher-income households in urban areas
child to public school rather  than private school? How  than it is for the 40 percent of lower-income households
great are these savings for various income groups? What  in rural areas.
are the determinants of enrollment by income group and  The best way to increase school enrollment is to
by location? How do individuals' education expenditures  successfully target public spending on education to poor
affect enrollment patterns?  households.
Among their findings:
- The nonpoor  households in urban areas get much of
the subsidy, or "savings," from government provision of
education services.
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Abstract 2
Standard  benefit-incidence  analysis  assumes  that the subsidy  and the quality  of educational  services  are the
same  for all income  deciles.  This is a strong  assumption  that  has the tendency  to minimize  the distributional
inequity  within educational  levels. This paper uses a new approach,  which prevents  this drawback.  The
marginal  willingness  to pay analysis  measures  the government's  provision  for public  schools  effect  on the
educational  spending  behavior  of an average  household.  In analyzing  the impact of public spending  on
household  behavior,  this paper focuses  on the following  questions:  What would  an average  household  h
with a given set of characteristics  (Xh) willing to spend on an individual  child i with traits (Xc), if
subsidized  public education  facilities  were not available?  What would the household  have "saved" by
sending  the child to public  schools  instead of private schools?  How large are these "savings"  for various
income groups? Which are the determinants  for enrollment  by income groups and location? How do
individuals'  educational  expenditures  affect  enrollment  patterns?
Among some of the most interesting  findings  that this paper shows are: i) the non-poor  and those in
urban areas get a large share of the subsidy  or "savings"  from the government  provision  of educational
services.  ii) The valuation  for private  educational  services  is higher  for the wealthy  as compared  to for the
poor. iii) School  quality differences  are higher at primnary  level. These results reinforce  the finding  that
those households  with a  high level of educational  expenditures  get the largest subsidy from public
educational  services.
On the demand  side,  household  school  enrollment  and transition  patterns  are highly dependent  on the
cost of schooling,  head of household's educational  level, dwelling  services and household  income per
capita. On the supply side, the government's  effort greatly affects the probability of enrollment  and
transition.  The probability  of school  attendance  is much higher for the top 40% of the income  distribution
in urban  areas  when compared  to those in the bottom  40% in rural areas. The variable  government  effort
has a significant  marginal  impact  which  is many times  larger  for the 'Poor'  as compared  to the 'Wealthy'  (in
elasticity  terms, this variable  is more effective  for the poor by a factor  of 12 and by a factor  of 15 in rural
areas).  The differential  impact  suggests  that the goal of efficiency  in terms of maximizing  enrollments  in
secondary  school  level does not have a trade-off  with the goals of greater  equity  educational  opportunity.
Indeed,  these findings  indicate  that increases  in enrollment  will be more readily  obtained  if resources  are
successfully  targeted  towards  the poorer  income  group.
The paper is part of a comprehensive  work  meant  to build  a poverty  and inequality  strategy  for Mexico.
This  research  was  completed  as part  of  the "Earnings  Inequality  after  Mexico's  Economic  and  Educational  Reforms"
study  at the World  Bank.  We  are grateful  to INEGI  and  SEP  (Ministry  of Education)  for  providing  us with  the data.
These  are views  of the  authors,  and  need  not  reflect  those  of the  World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or countries  they
represent.
2This  paper  was  prepared  with  research  support  from  Monica  Tinajero.INTRODUCTION
Standard benefit-incidence analysis  assumes  that  the  subsidy  and the  quality  of educational
services are the same for all income deciles. This is a strong assumption that has the tendency to
minimize the distributional inequity within educational levels. This paper uses a new approach
that prevents this drawback. The marginal willingness to pay analysis measures the government's
provision for public schools effect on the educational spending behavior of an average household.
What would an average household with a given set of characteristics be willing to spend on an
individual child, if subsidized public education facilities were not available? What  would the
household have "saved" by sending the child to public schools instead of private schools? How
large are these "savings" for various income groups?
In addition, this paper investigates the link between the government's educational policy and
the  household's  decision-making  with  regards  to  its  educational  expenditure  and  schooling
enrollment. Consequently, this paper focuses on answering the following questions: Which are
the determinants for enrollment by income groups and location? How do individuals'  educational
expenditures affect enrollment patterns?
The study is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief description of the data. Section 2
examines  private  expenditures  on  education.  Section  3  studies  the  determinants  of  upper
secondary  enrollment.  Section  4  analyses  the  marginal  willingness to  pay  for  educational
services. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
1  THE  DA TA
This paper uses the data from the National Household Income and Expenditures Survey (ENIGH)
for  1996.  The  ENIGH  is  collected  by  the  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadistica,  Geografia  e
Informdtica (INEGI). This survey is available for 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 19963.  Each survey
is  representative  at  national  level,  urban  and  rural  areas.  For  1996,  the  ENIGH  is  also
representative  for  the  states  of  Mexico,  Campeche, Coahuila,  Guanajuato,  Hidalgo,  Jalisco,
Oaxaca and Tabasco.
The  survey design was  stratified, multistage and  clustered. The final  sampling unit is the
household and all the members within the household who were interviewed. 4 In each stage, the
selection probability was proportional to the size of the sampling unit. Then, it is necessary to use
the weighs5 in order to get suitable estimators. The available information can be grouped in three
categories:
*  Income and consumption: the survey has monetary, no monetary and financial items.
*  Individual characteristics:  social  and  demographic,  i.e.,  age,  school  attendance,  level of
schooling, position at work, economic sector, etc.
*  Household characteristics.
In addition,  data  from the  Direccion General  de Planeacion,  Programacion  y Presupuesto
(DGPPyP, Ministry of Education) regarding educational government expenditures (Federal plus
state) assigned to the different levels of schooling for each state is used in order to calculate the
unit costs.
3The  sample in a given year is independent from another.
4The  sample size for 1996 is as follows: households 14,042 and individuals 64,3  59.
The weights should be calculated according to the survey design and corresponds to the inverse ofthe probability inclusion.
22  PRIVA TE  EXPENDITURES INEDUCA TION
On the demand side, household enrollment patterns are highly dependent on the cost of schooling.
The total monetary cost for the household, without considering the opportunity cost, comprises
school fees, tuition and unforeseen expenses, transportation  cost, textbooks, stationery, and
uniforms.  Table 4 in appendix I shows how much an average  household spend on education  by
poverty  status and educational  level. Table below illustrates  the fact that most students  who are in
private schools  spend in education  more  than twice than those students  who  are in public  schools.
As it can observed  in this table, the share of the expenditures  in services  and materials  are similar
for both private and public school, while the fees and unforeseen expenses constitute the
differences  in total school expenditures  between  private and public schools. In private schools,
fees and unforeseen  expenses  account for 70% of the school expenditures  compared to 38% in
public schools.  Moreover,  the educational  expenditures  in the urban areas are twice as high as in
rural  areas (see table 5 in appendix 1).
Table 1. Household Expenditure in Education by Poverty Status, 1996
Poverty Status  Expenditures per student (%)  Educational  Services, materials  Number of
Fees/Unforeseen  Services  Materials "  Total  Expenditures  Expenditures  Households
expenses  (%)2/  2/
Private schools
Extreme  70.3  1.0  28.7  100.0  14.6  4.3  12
Moderate  75.1  4.3  20.7  100.0  11.1  2.8  50
Non poor  70.8  5.5  23.7  100.0  16.7  4.9  499
Total  70.9  5.4  23.7  100.0  16.6  4.8  561
Public schools
Extreme  32.2  1.2  66.6  100.0  6.3  4.3  2825
Moderate  35.2  2.4  62.4  100.0  7.0  4.5  2511
Non poor  41.8  5.4  52.7  100.0  6.7  3.9  2544
Total  38.3  3.8  57.8  100.0  6.7  4.2  7880
Source: ENIGH 96
1/  Textbooks,  stationery,  etc.
2/ As percentage  of household's  expenditures
Table 2 below compares  the expenditure  of poor and non-poor students by education  level,
showing  significant  disparities.  At primary level, non-poor  students in public school spend four
times the amount than extreme  poor students spend in education.  While at the university level
non-poor  individuals  spend 1.4  times as much  as poor students.  These  differences  might be partly
explained  by scholarships  or discounts  on tuition fees among  the poor.
Information  at the individual  level on schooling  expenditures  is available only for school fees,
tuition  and unforeseen  expenses,  but assuming  that the amount  spend on materials  and services  is
fixed  for all levels of education,  the individual  total educational  expenditures  are much  lower than
the government  subsidy.  In fact, the public subsidy  compared  to the average student expenditure
is 2.8  times for  primary  level, 2.3  for  lower secondary,  2.2  for  upper  secondary  and  5.2 for
university.
3Table 2. Expenditures in Education per Student (Fees/tuition/unforeseen expenses)"'  by Level
of Education, 1996
Poverty  Status  Primary  Lower  Secondary  Upper  Secondary  Tertiary
Public  and  Private  schools
Extreme  76.7  268.2  851.9  1828.7
Moderate  186.3  491.6  975.9  835.9
Non poor  1378.9  1404.7  2965.1  5448.7
Total  425.4  750.1  1996.2  4466.8
Public schools
Extreme  74.6  262.4  760.1  1828.7
Moderate  179.4  485.2  883.7  817.4
Non poor  307.4  712.5  1292.1  2577.7
Total  156.8  492.9  1057.4  2141.6
Private schools
Extreme  1422.5  1252.5  2845.0  0.0
Moderate  1739.0  1088.7  2540.3  1179.4
Non poor  6468.1  6539.0  8515.2  12950.5
Total  6241.9  5915.4  7495.3  12451.3
Source:  ENIGH 96
1/ Annual pesos per student
The total cost (student expenditure plus government subsidy) per  student in primary public
school corresponds to about 35% of the private primary school cost. For students in lower and
upper secondary it represents 43% and 53%, respectively. On the other hand, the cost of tertiary
level is 13% higher in public schools as compared to private (see tables below). An interesting
question that arises is why the cost at tertiary level is higher in public than in private schools. Is it
because the subsidy is not being used efficiently, or because the infrastructure (research institutes,
libraries, museums, entertainment centers, etc.) they offer is costly?
In the next section a technique is applied that will allow us to evaluate the impact of public
expenditures on household spending patterns.
Table  3. Individual  Educational  Expenditures"  plus Subsidy  in Public Schools  by Poverty Status 2'
Poverty  Status  Primary  Lower  Secondary  Upper  Secondary  Tertiary
Extreme  2799  3266  5002  16970
Moderate  3267  3852  5489  16322
Non poor  3941  4626  6444  18629
Total  3268  3883  5686  17670
Source: ENIGH 96 and DGPPyP, SEP
" Fees/tuition/unforeseen expenses, services and materials, 2/ Annual pesos
Table 4. Individual Educational Expenditures'/ in Private Schools by Poverty Status
Poverty Status  Primary  Lower Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary
Extreme  2295  2125  3717
Moderate  2390  1740  3191  1831
Non poor  9851  9922  11898  16334
Total  9387  9060  10640  15596
Source:  ENIGH 96 and DGPPyP, SEP
1/ Fees/tuition/unforeseen expenses, services and materials,  2/Annual pesos
4The preliminary results  on  the  pattern of  individual  expenditures with children  in public
schools suggest that the burden on poor households can be substantial, and that it is unlikely that
a poor household would afford to attend a private school 6.
3  ESTIMA TING THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT  SPENDING ON HOUSEHOLD  EDUCA  TIONAL
EXPENDITURES
Looking at the impact of public educational expenditures by deciles, it is usually assumed that the
subsidy and the quality of education are uniformly the same for all  income deciles. This is a
strong assumption that tends to  minimize the distributional inequity within educational levels.
The Marginal Willingness to pay approach prevents this drawback and estimates a willingness to
pay equation for private school services corrected for self-selection bias, using standard Heckman
methodology. Appendix 2 reviews this methodology.
In  analyzing  the  impact  of  public  spending  on  household  behavior,  one  could  ask  the
following questions: What would an average household h with a given set of characteristics (Xh)
be willing to  spend on  an  individual child  i  with traits  (Xc),  if  subsidized public  education
facilities were not available? What would the household have "saved"  by sending the child  to
public schools instead of private  schools? How large are these  "savings"  for various income
groups?
Intuitively, one would think that household "savings"  could be estimated as the difference in
household education  spending on  public versus  private  schooling of  children of  comparable
characteristics. While the concept appears straightforward, the estimation is not. The challenge is
to ensure that these two groups of children are comparable. One can argue that due to observable
and  unobservable  factors,  the  two  groups  of  children  are  in  fact  different.  Examples  of
measurable  variables  are  family  income  and  parents'  education.  Examples  of  unobserved
variables that can generate self-selection bias is preference for religious instruction, high rate of
return to quality due to child's  exceptional intelligence, and taste for individualized instruction.
Lack of control for these unobservable factors would overstate the potential household "savings"
associated with the provision of subsidized public education. Households send their children to
private schools despite availability of public school places, because they want higher quality and
additional services that they cannot find in public schools.
The Heckman's methodology starts by estimating a probit equation. The probit equation or
step  1 (see appendix 2) has as dependent variable whether child  i is attending private school
(value of 1) or public school (value of 0).  The explanatory variables are per capita household
income, years of school of household head (hh), area (urban/rural), age, gender, number of rooms,
type of floor and number of children in household. The trigger variable that identifies the model
is the number of students per classroom, by type of education at municipal level. Table 5 provides
the results of the estimation.
b  An illustration of the disproportional burden of education on the poor can be obtained by comparing household expenditures on
education with non-food expenditures per capita.
5Table 5. Probit  on Private School Attendance
Explanatory  Coefficient  Marginal
Variable  Effect
Per capita  income  0.78  *  0.064
Years  of schooling  of head  0.03  *  0.002
Area (rural)  0.80  *  0.046  +
Age  0.16  *  0.014
Age  squared  0.00  *  0.000
Gender  (female)  -0.12  **  -0.010  +
Number  of rooms  0.09  *  0.008
Floor  (notfinishedfloor)  0.40  *  0.037  +
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.32  *  0.024  +
Number  of Children  -0.10  *  -0.008
Trigger  Variable  -0.09  *  -0.008
Constant  -7.56  *
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
* Significant  at 5%
** Significant  at 10%o
Italics  indicates  the reference  category  for  dichotomous  variables
(+)  dF/dx  stands  for the discrete  change  in the dummy  variable  from 0 to I
The first column on table 5 has the coefficient and the second shows the marginal effects as
estimated from the probit. 7 Notice that all explanatory variables are significant at 5% level, except
for gender. In addition, all explanatory variables show the expected sign on  the probability to
attend  private  school.  For  instance,  the  probability  to  attend  private  school  is  positively
influenced by per capita household income and area.
The household's willingness to pay for private education (Pv) of child i (step 2) in Heckman's
methodology is estimated using total educational expenditures on private schools (fees, tuition,
unforeseen expenses and  school materials 8)  as dependent variable. 9 Explanatory variables  are
Mills' ratio and the variables from the probit estimation except the trigger variablelo.
Using the estimates from step 2 and step 3 and the mean of all explanatory variables, one can
compute the amount of money that households would be willing to pay for the child's private
education (AMVWPv,  step 4) or public education (MM  WPu, step 5). Notice that the  difference
between MMWPv and AMWPu measure the effect of the government provision of public schools
on the education spending behavior of an average household. Note that this difference reflects the
relative quality and payments (fees and unforeseen expenses) associated with public and private
schools.
Next, how large household "savings" is computed for different population subgroups by area,
poverty status, educational level and total educational expenditures by quantile.
Tables I through 9 in appendix 2 show the average values of the explanatory variables for the
different  population  subgroups.  Beforesaid, these  values  are  used to  compute  the  marginal
willingness to pay corrected for self-selection bias."
As indicated on table I in appendix 2, all the explanatory variables turned are significant in the
process of computing the marginal willingness to pay for public educational service except for
gender. In the case of private education, the relevant variables are income, years of schooling of
the head of the household and sewage.
' The marginal  effect  for continuous  variables  is the marginal  effect as evaluated  at the mean of the particular  exogenous  variable,
Dichotomous  variables  have been coded as 'O' or '1', and the marginal  effect for such variables  represents  the impact of the
probability  of having  a  I' value  for the exogenous  variable,  as compared  to a 'O' value,  the other  variables  being  held constant  at their
mean values.
s Included  only  those students  with  positive  fees,  tuition  and unforeseen  expenses.
9  Step  3 uses public  educational  expenditures  instead  of private  ones.
'° See  appendix  2.
1  l Note that it is not possible  to compare  directly  actual  average  payments  with  the marginal  willingness  to pay  since the  later controls
for observed  factors.
6Table 6. Effect of public  schools  provision  on an average household  education spending
MMWPv  6274.88
MMWPu  1080.92
Effect  or "savings'  5193.96
Source:  Own  calculation  based  on  ENIGH  96
1/  Annual  1996  pesos
Assuming that there are no differences  in the quality of education between a  public and a
private school, it is seen in table 6 (after controlling for observed and unobserved factors) that
family's  savings from sending a child to a public school amount to approximately $5,000 pesos
per year (0.56 minimum wages in 1996). In addition, the results suggest that such savings are
correlated with the schooling of the household head, location and number of children at home.
Now, assuming that the difference between private and public schools students'  scores is only
10%, then, ninety percent of the effect or "savings" is due to relative payments and unforeseen
expenses. The rest will reflect the amount that the average child would have to pay for "quality
difference" in moving from a public to a private school.
The marginal willingness to pay desegregated by area is shown on table 7. Supposing that the
quality between public and private schools in both rural and urban areas is the same, then, it turns
out that the government provision of public schools is higher in urban areas than in rural areas.
This result could be explained among other things, by the following factors: (i) poor location of
public educational services; (ii) distance that an individual has to travel to the nearest school; (iii)
the population dispersion and lastly the opportunity cost of the children in rural areas.
On the other hand, assuming that there  is not a  quality difference between private-public
schools in rural areas and the quality difference between public-private schools in urban areas is a
little above 50%, the relative payments and unforeseen expenses would be the same in both areas.
Finally, assuming that the quality difference between public and private rural schools is zero but
the quality difference in urban areas is 10%, then the relative payments and unforeseen expenses
(as part of the "effect") in urban areas is higher than in rural areas (urban effect $4,016 pesos and
rural effect $2,245 pesos). In summary, such scenarios suggest that students in urban areas get a
larger share of the subsidy or "savings"  from the government provision of educational services
compared to these in rural areas.
Table 7. Effect 11of public schools provision on household education spending by area
Urban  Rural
MMWPv  6459  2674
MMWPu  1438  429
Effect  5021  2245
Source:  Own  calculation  based  on  ENIGH  96
1/  Annual  1996  pesos
As shown on table 8, the government provision to public schools has a smaller impact on the
poor as compared to the non-poor. Notice on table 4 in appendix 2, that for both poor and non-
poor, gender is not important in the determination of the MMWPu, while per  capita household
income, age, and number of children do have an impact. It is important to note that while the
education of the household head determines the MMWPu for the poor, it does not affect it for the
non-poor. With respect to AMWPv  for poverty  status, table 5  in appendix  2  shows that the
educational level of the household head affects the MMWPv for both groups, while the per capita
household income does affect the non-poor. The age of the children impacts on the AMWPv  of
the poor, but it does not have any effect on the non-poor. Finally, again gender is not important in
the MMWPv for the poor as well as the non-poor.
The analysis by poor/non-poor and region suggests the following: i) the non-poor and those in
urban  areas get a  large share of the subsidy  or "savings"  from the  government provision  of
education services; and ii) the valuation for private educational services is higher for the wealthy
as compared to for the poor. In light of these results, plausible alternatives for the government
7include: (i) to better target  public educational services; (ii) charge a fee for  public educational
services to the non-poor; and (iii) increase the quality of educational services for the poor.
Table 8. Effect " of public schools provision on household education spending by poverty status'
2
Extreme  Moderate  Non Poor
MMWPv  2114.63  2963.22  7229.76
MMWPu  849.23  1241.22  1073.99
Effect  1265.40  1722.00  6155.77
Source: Own calculation based on ENIGH 96
1/ Annual 1996 pesos
As follows from table 6 in appendix 2, at the primary level, all  explanatory variables turned
are significant for explaining the MMWPu. In lower secondary level, the variables household per
capita income, region, number of rooms, type of floor and number of children are important in the
determination of the  MMWPu.  While  for  upper  secondary  instruction,  household per  capita
income and  age are relevant.  Interestingly, household per  capita  income is  also a  significant
variable in explaining MMWPv (see table 7 in appendix 2). This suggests that parent's valuation
for private educational services relies solely on income while for public educational services there
are other important factors in addition to income that determines MMWPu.
In table  9, the effect  of  government provision  of school  services  is very  similar  for both
primary and lower secondary schooling  level (basic education).
13 This effect  is higher in basic
education  as compared to  upper  secondary or technical  education.  Assuming  that the  quality
difference between private and public schools is only 10% for all  levels of education, relative
payments and unforeseen expenses ("savings") will be much higher in basic  school as compared
to  upper  secondary  level.  For  primary  through  upper  secondary  level,  there  is  a  positive
decreasing relationship  between the payments difference (in private versus public schools) and
instruction level. Allowing such difference to be a proxy for quality, then, the quality difference
between private and public schools  in primary level is 70%,  in lower secondary is 60% and in
upper secondary is 50%. This indicates that quality differences are higher in primary level. The
remaining savings are due to payments and provisions.
Table 9. Effect" of public schools provision on household education spending by educational level
Pre  Primary  Lower  Upper  Technical
Primary  Secondary  Secondary  Education
MMWPv  5856.12  6920.00  8024.88  7156.88  3688.08
MMWPu  880.36  714.68  1725.68  2541.96  2539.2
Effect  4975.76  6205.32  6299.2  4614.92  1148.88
Source: Own calculation based on ENIGH 96
1/ Annual 1996 pesos
In addition to Least Squares Regression (LSR), quantile regressions'4 were computed to test
for robustness of the above results. The aim is to assess how large these "savings" are for various
educational  expenditure groups.  Results of this test  indicate that the  distribution of "savings"
might be right-skewed  since  the  MAfWPu, MMWPv  and  the  savings  effect,  evaluated at  the
median of the total educational expenditure distribution, are lower than in the LSR. Note that at
the  median  of the  public  educational  expenditures distribution  all  explanatory  variables  are
significant for explaining MMWPu (see table 8 in appendix 2). Yet, at the tails of this distribution,
variables  such as  gender,  number  of  children  and  schooling  of  the  household  head  are  not
significant in explaining MMWPu.
12 If we assume that the income distribution for the extreme poor is uniform, therefore an average poor household will
get $9510.00 annual 1996 pesos (it is assumed that the household average size is 5 and that the poverty extreme line is
$317.00 monthly per capita 1996 pesos).
3 The analysis was not performed for the tertiary level because the "trigger variable" was not available at that level of education.
4 See appendix 3 for a brief review of the quantile regression technique.
8Another observation is that at the median and lower tail of the private educational expenditure
distribution,  variables  such as  income,  household  head  schooling  and  housing  facilities  are
important to determine the MM￿FWPv.  At the upper tail of the distribution, household per  capita
income is the only relevant variable that determines MA'IWPv  (table 9 in appendix 2).
Table 10. Effect" of public schools supply on household education spending through out the conditional'
5
expenditure distribution
Quantile  Quantile  Quantile  Quantile  Quantile
0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9
MMWPv  1101.48  2843.56  5781  16291.04  39533.6
MMWPu  16.52  252.12  1636.2  6241.2  12897.04
Effect  1084.96  2591.44  4144.84  10049.88  26636.56
Source:  Own calculation  based  on ENIGH  96
1/ Annual 1996 pesos
It is seen from the above analysis and from table 10 that those households with a high level of
educational expenditures receive the largest subsidy from public educational services. Given that
there is a strong positive relationship between educational expenditures and per capita household
income, a reasonable conclusion might be that the government should charge a fee to those in the
upper tail of the income distribution especially considering that the wealthy individuals have both
a high valuation for quality of schooling and are able to pay for the educational service.
4  FACTORS THATDETERMINE UPPER  SECONDARYENROLLMENT
Next, the factors that determine enrollment in upper secondary school level are analyzed. 16 This is
done  in  order  to  assess  which  household  and  government  variables  affect  enrollment  and
retention at upper secondary level.
For purpose of the following analysis, the probability being modeled is enrollment in upper
secondary school for individuals age 15 to  19, the official school age for this level of education.
The child and household level variables are: (a) demographic variables, including the number of
babies, children, and adults, as well as the square of the number of babies, children, and adults,
the age of the household head and its square, and the household head gender; (b) the age and age
squared of the child; (c) education variables: the educational level of the head in categories (some
primary school, primary school completed, lower secondary complete, upper secondary complete
and higher); and (c) occupation variables: the household head's  industrial sector of employment
and position occupied, as well as an indicator for the formal sector. The government variables are
measured at  state level and include: federal expenditures in 1996 pesos per  student at both the
basic and upper  secondary school level and the number of teachers  per thousand individuals  in
age range 15-19.
Table  1  in  appendix  4  presents  the  marginal  effects  as  estimated  from  the  probits  for
,nrollment at a national level as well as the impact of the exogenous variables across the income
distribution and through urban and rural areas. This is of interest  in the exam of the  impact of
government subsidies and schooling variables on the poor. If government concerns for equity are
translated into higher school enrollment, one might expect to see a stronger impact of government
transfers  and a supply of educational services for the poorer  income groups and  rural areas, as
opposed to the relatively wealthy groups. Table 1 in appendix 4 also shows the probit regressions
results run separately on for the 'Poor'  and "Wealthy"  income groups, which in turn are formed
by the bottom 40 % and the top 40 % of the income distribution.
15  Conditional to per capita income, years of schooling of head,  area (rural), age,  age squared, gender,  number of
rooms, type of floor, sewage, number of children, trigger variable.
6 For a review of factors that  affect basic education enrollment, see  World Bank (1999).  Government Programs and  Poverty  in
Mexico, Green Cover.
9For the overall population, the probability of enrollment is positively influenced by head of
household's  educational  level after lower  secondary, dwelling's  services such  as sewage and
household income per capita. Aside from being sewage an important indicator of family wealth,
the absence of sewage suggest the  possible necessity for children to be involved in a  greater
number of household chores. The positive marginal effects from such variable increases by 7%
the probability of enrollment.
Variables with a negative influence include student's age, female gender (not significant) and
family size. Note the 12 % negative impact of some primary schooling for the household head in
the  poorer  group,  as  compared  to  the  statistically  insignificant  impact  of  this  variable  on
enrollment probability amongst the richer group. Similarly, household head income per capita has
a 5% positive impact on the probability of enrollment in urban areas, and the impact of household
head income per capita is absent among the rural.
Table 11. Determinants  of Upper  Secondary  School  Enrollment
Full Sample Poorest  40%  Richest  40%  Urban  Rural
Probability of enrollment  0.66  0.49  0.82  0.73  0.39
Mean Income  7.44  6.63  8.14  7.56  7.03
Mean teachers  1.89  1.80  1.95  1.90  1.84
Income Elasticity  0.58  -1.11  0.44  0.53  0.11
Teachers Elasticity  0.20  0.49  0.04  0.08  1.19
Source: Own calculations based on ENIGH 96
As can be seen on table 11, the probability of enrollment in upper secondary is much higher
for both the top 40% of the income distribution and in urban areas as compared to those in the
bottom 40%  and  in  rural  areas. The variable  teachers  (government effort) has  a  significant
marginal impact which is many times larger for the 'Poor'  as compared to for the 'Wealthy'  and
for rural areas as compared to urban  areas. In  elasticity terms, the  teacher's variable  is more
effective for the poor and for the rural areas by factors of 12 and 15, respectively. The differential
impact  suggests  that  the  goal  of  efficiency  in  terms  of  maximizing  enrollments  in  upper
secondary school  does not have  a  trade-off  with  the  goals of  greater  equity  of  educational
opportunity. Indeed, the above findings indicate that increases in enrollment will be more readily
obtained if resources are successfully targeted towards the poorer income group. It is of interest to
note the negligible impact of educational transfers, which could probably be explained by the null
variance of educational transfers among states. Investigation in this phenomenon would play an
important note in policy decisions regarding the allocation of resources in upper secondary.
5  CONCLUSIONS
Preliminary evidence suggests that the burden of educational expenditures on poor households is
high. This finding  suggest that  actions aimed  at  increasing the participation  of poor children
should  comprise subsidies  for  secondary  textbooks,  scholarships  for  transports  and  schools
materials to reduce the burden on other schooling costs (i.e., unforeseen expenditures).
At primary level, non-poor students in public school spend four times the amount that extreme
poor students spend in education. While at the university level non-poor individuals spend  1.4
times as much as poor students. The public subsidy, compared to the average student expenditure,
is 2.8 times for  primary level, 2.3  for lower  secondary, 2.2 for upper  secondary and  5.2  for
university.
The total cost (student expenditure plus government subsidy) per  student in primary public
school corresponds to about 35% of the private primary school cost. For students in lower and
upper secondary it represents 43% and 53%, respectively. On the other hand, the cost of tertiary
level is 13% higher in public schools as compared to private
10Probability to attend private school is positively influenced by per capita household income,
number of house rooms, household head education level, and area (urban=1).
All explanatory variables are significant in the process of computing the marginal willingness
to pay for public education services except for gender. As one moved through the expenditures
distribution,  gender,  number  of  children  and  the  schooling  of  the  household head,  are  not
significant  in explaining AMMPu  at  the tails of  this  distribution. Yet,  at  the  median of the
distribution, these variables are relevant. The non-poor and urban  students get the most of the
"savings" or effect from the public provision of school services at the basic education level. Our
results show that it is likely that a large share of the effect or "savings" in basic schooling are due
to differences in the quality of education between private and public schools.
There  is a  strong positive  relationship  between  educational  expenditures  and  per  capita
household income. Then government should charge a-fee to those in the upper tail of the income
distribution especially considering that the wealthy individuals have both a  high valuation for
quality of schooling and are able to pay for the educational service
The analysis indicates that the age, schooling, sector of activity and income per capita of the
household head, as well as government effort (transfers or supply of teachers) are all relevant
variables in explaining the probability of enrollment in upper secondary level. Special attention
should be given to both the household head income per capita and the government's  effort in light
of the large marginal effect it has on upper secondary enrollment, particularly on the poor.
11APPENDIX 1.  ENROLLMENTS  AND  EXPENDiTURES  ON  EDUCATION
Table 1. Enrollments by type of school, 1994
Education  level  Public  Private  Others  Total
Primary  13,593,797  895,913  40,689  14,530,399
Lower  Secondary  4,661,522  388,806  12,004  5,062,332
Upper  Secondary  2,386,758  778,587  49,385  3,214,730
Tertiary  1,461,189  530,754  1,503  1,993,446
Source:  ENIGH  94
Table 2. Enrollments by type of school, 1996
Public  Private  Others  Total
Primary  13,802,395  768,748  1,746  14,572,889
Lower  Secondary  4,972,116  326,229  4,153  5,302,498
Upper  Secondary  2,767,993  875,129  15,782  3,658,904
Tertiary  1,459,820  580,962  7,680  2,048,462
Source:  ENIGH  96
Table 3. Federal Expenditure (Thousands of 1996 constant pesos)
1994  1996
Primary  32,351,871  33,328,323
Lower Secondary  15,508,552  13,394,898
Upper  Secondary  11,916,903  10,884,850
Tertiary  23,688,868  21,651,986
Source:  DGPPyP,  SEP
12Table 4. Household Expenditure on Education by Poverty Status "i, 1996
Type  of school  Expenditures  per student  Educational  Sample
size  3/
Fees/Unforeseen Services  Materials  t,  Total  Expenditures  (%) 2/
expenses
Private  schools
Extreme  2063.7  29.8  842.4  2935.9  14.6  12
Moderate  1959.9  111.7  539.4  2611.0  11.1  50
Non poor  8216.8  632.7  2750.4  11599.9  16.7  499
Total  7662.3  584.6  2560.1  10807.0  16.6  561
Public schools
Extreme  147.0  5.3  304.4  114.2  6.3  2825
Moderate  365.9  24.9  648.0  259.7  7.0  2511
Non poor  876.6  113.8  1105.3  523.9  6.7  2544
Total  432.9  43.5  652.6  282.3  6.7  7880
Urban  schools
Extreme  253.3  8.9  422.4  171.1  8.2  1186
Moderate  432.1  29.8  702.2  291.0  7.6  1867
Non poor  2454.3  227.6  1486.6  1042.1  10.5  2561
Total  1245.4  108.6  970.2  581.0  9.7  5614
Rural schools
Extreme  69.9  2.4  206.0  69.6  4.4  1651
Moderate  213.2  10.8  412.9  159.2  4.9  694
Non poor  417.7  58.2  724.9  300.2  4.5  482
Total  139.2  10.3  307.9  114.3  4.6  2827
Source:  ENIGH  96
1/  Textbooks,  stationery,  etc.
2/ As percentage  of household's  expenditures
3/ Number  of households
4/ Annual  pesos  per student
Table 5. Household Expenditure on Education by Pove Ly  Status, 196
Poverty  Status  Expenditures  per student  (%)  Educational  Services,  Materials Number  of
Fees/Unforesee  Services Materials  1  Total  Expenditures  Expenditures  Households
n expenses  (%)2/  ()
Urban  schools
Extreme  37.0  1.3  61.7  100.0  8.2  5.1  1186
Moderate  37.1  2.6  60.3  100.0  7.6  4.8  1867
Non poor  58.9  5.5  35.7  100.0  10.5  4.3  2561
Total  53.6  4.7  41.7  100.0  9.7  4.5  5614
Rural  schools
Extreme  25.1  0.8  74.0  100.0  4.4  3.3  1651
Moderate  33.5  1.7  64.8  100.0  4.9  3.2  694
Non poor  34.8  4.8  60.4  100.0  4.5  2.9  482
Total  30.4  2.3  67.3  100.0  4.6  3.2  2827
Source:  ENIGH  96
1/Textbooks,  stationary,  etc
2/ As percentage  of household's  expenditures
13APPENDIX  2. EFFECT  OF  GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  ON  HOUSEHOLD  EDUCATION
EXPENDITURES
2.1  MARGINAL  WILLIGNESS  TO PA YMETHODOLOGYI 7
Step 1. Estimate the selection equation, using probit to analyze the factors determining
household choice between public and private school for child i:
(1) Yi  = Y(Xi, Zi)
where  Yi =  1 if child  i is in private school; 0 if public
Xi =  a  vector  of  independent  variables  such  as  father's  income,  parent's
education, household assets, location, age and sex of child, etc.
Zi =  a trigger  variable (to  identify the  whole  model) that  appears in  this
selection equation but not in the willingness to pay equation (see below).
One can develop an underlying household  utility maximization model to  generate the
above specification.
Step 2. Estimate the household's willingness to pay for private education (Pv) of child i,
e.g.
(2) Pi = Pv(Xi, Mi, Ui)
where  Pi  household willingness to pay for private education of child i
Mi =  mill's ratio calculated from the above probit equation
Ui  =  error term with mean value  zero
Step  3. Estimnate  the household's  willingness to pay for public education (Pu) of child i,
e.g.
(3) Pi = Pu(Xi, Mi, Ui)
The following counterfactual exercise  could then  be done.  Consider an  average
child with mean values of Xi = xi and Mi = mi. What would his household be willing to
spend for his private education?
Step  4. Using eq. 2 and plugging the mean value of Xi and Mi,  the willingness to pay Pi
for private education could be estimated. Denote estimate as MeanPVi .This is different
from the actual observed mean Pv, which is the average for the self-selected sample of
private school children.
Similarly, one could ask of such an average child: What would his household be
willing to spend for public education? To answer this question:
17 Vicente Paqueo and Lopez-Acevedo (1999). Methodological Note, mimeo.
14Step 5. Using eq. 3 and plugging the mean value of Xi and Mi, we get an estimate of the
amount of money the household would be willing to pay for the child's public education.
Denote estimate as MeanPUi. Again this will be different  from the observed average
education spending of households for children in public schools, which would reflect the
behavior of a self-selected sample of users of public education.
Step 6. Take the difference between MeanPVi and MeanPUi to measure the effect of the
government provision of public schools on the education spending behavior of an average
household.
Note that this difference would reflect the relative quality and payments (fees and
contributions) associated with public and private schools. We can calculate this effect for
various income groups by plugging their respective mean values for Xi and Mi into eqs.
1-3.
A key question in this type of analysis is the availability of the trigger variable (Zi)
to identify the model, which can be the provincial average learning achievement score of
public schools relative to that of private schools, as index of the relative quality of these
two types of schools.
2.2.  TABLES
Table 1. Household Expenditures on Educational Service
Public Service  Private Service
Explunatories variables  Coef.  Mean  M.W. to P.  Explanatories variables  Coef  Mean  M.W. to P.
LogNat per capita H income  0.76  *  7.21  5.46  LogNat per capita H income  0.57  *  8.30  4.69
Years of Schooling ofHH  0.01 *  591  005  Years of Schooling ofHH  0.02 *  10.11  0.19
Region (rural)  0.66  *  0.77  0.50  Region (rural)  0.06  0.97  0.06
Age  0.12  *  11.12  1.30  Age  0.02  13.62  0.32
Squared Age  0.00 *  143.74  -0.35  Squared Age  0.00  222.68  -0.13
Gender (female)  -0.04  0.53  -0.02  Gender (female)  0.05  0.46  0.02
Number of rooms  0.09 *  2.91  0.27  Number of rooms  -0.02  4.16  -0.08
Floor (notfinishedfloor)  0.22 *  0.27  0.06  Floor (notfinishedfloor}  0.02  0.71  0.01
Sewage (not  sewage)  0.26 *  0.66  0.17  Sewage (not  sewage)  0.48  *  0.94  0.45
Number of Children  -0.12 *  2.35  -0.29  Number of Children  -0.02  2.00  -0.04
Mill's Ratio  0.45 *  2.47  1.12  Mill's Ratio  -0.01  0.87  -0.01
Constant  -2.67 *  -2.67  Constant  1.87 *  1.87
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable:
Log Nat Expenditure  5.60  5.60  Log Nat Expenditure  7.32  7.36
Evaluated in pesos  270.64  270.23  Evaluated in pesos  1506.59  1568.72
R  2  0.42  R
2 0.35
Source: Own calculations based on ENIGH 96 and DGPyP, SEP
* Significant at 5%,  ** Significant at 10%
Italics: Reference category
15Table 2. Household Expenditure on Educational Public Service by Area
Urban  Rural
Explanatories  variables  Coef.  Mean  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Mean  M.W.  to P.
LogNat per  capita  income  0.65 *  7.4  4.84  0.97 *  6.6  6.38
Years of Schooling  of HH  0.02 *  6.7  0.12  -0.02  3.2  -0.06
Age  0.11 *  11.4  1.30  0.09 *  10.2  0.94
Squared  Age  0.00 *  151.3  -0.35  0.00  119.0  -0.10
Gender (female)  -0.02  0.5  -0.01  -0.09  0.5  -0.04
Number  of rooms  0.08 *  3.1  0.24  0.18 *  2.2  0.39
Floor  (notfinishedfloor)  0.29 *  0.3  0.10  -0.05  0.1  0.00
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.25 *  0.8  0.20  0.26 *  0.2  0.04
Number  of Children  -0.09 *  2.3  -0.20  -0.21 *  2.5  -0.52
Mill's  Ratio  0.47 *  2.2  1.04  0.38 *  3.3  1.25
Constant  -1.39 *  -1.39  -3.60 *  -3.60
Dependent  Variable:
Log  Nat Expenditure  5.9  5.88  4.7  4.68
Evaluated  in pesos  359.70  359.57  106.90  107.31
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
*  Significant  at 5%,  *  * Significant  at 10%
Table 3. Household Expenditure on Educational Private Service by Area
Urban  Rural
Explanatories  variables  Coef.  Mean  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Mean  M.W.  to P.
Log  Nat per capita  income  0.58 *  8.3  4.81  0.42  *  7.34943  3.065
Years of Schooling  of HH  0.02 *  10.3  0.20  0.01  4.92671  0.050
Age  0.02  13.5  0.33  0.19 **  17.2694  3.366
SquaredAge  0.00  219.3  -0.13  0.00  319.836  -1.303
Gender  (female)  0.06  0.5  0.03  -0.40  *  0.41872  -0.166
Number  of rooms  -0.02  4.2  -0.10  -0.04  3.10346  -0.123
Floor  (notfinishedfloor)  0.04  0.7  0.03  -0.51  *  0.22027  -0.113
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.62 *  1.0  0.59  0.46  0.41467  0.190
Number  of Children  -0.03  2.0  -0.05  -0.16  2.53821  -0.394
Mill's  Ratio  0.01  0.8  0.01  0.15  1.94875  0.300
Constant  1.68 *  1.68  1.63  1.634
Dependent  Variable
Log  Nat Expenditure  7.3  7.39  6.54069  6.50
Evaluated  in pesos  1548.0  1614.7  692.8  668.4
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
* Significant  at 5%,  ** Significant  at 10%
Table 4. Household Expenditure on Educational Public Service by Povery Status
Exteme  Moderate  No Poor
Explanatory  variables  Coef.  Mean M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Mean M.W. to P.  Coef.  Mean M.W. to P.
LogNat  per capita  income  0.64 *  6.49  4.14  0.47 *  7.22  3.41  0.84 *  7.42  6.25
Years  of Schooling  of HH  0.03 *  4.39  0.15  0.02 *  6.02  0.14  0.00  6.30  -0.02
Region  (rural)  Dropped  1.00  0.00  dropped  1.00  0.00  0.47 *  0.56  0.27
Age  0.10 *  10.45  1.06  0.14 *  11.08  1.53  0.10 *  11.34  1.17
Squared  Age  0.00  121.76  -0.14  0.00 *  138.78  -0.41  0.00 *  153.21  -0.34
Gender  -0.08  0.54  -0.04  -0.01  0.54  -0.01  -0.04  0.51  -0.02
Number  of rooms  0.02  2.43  0.06  0.11 *  2.90  0.33  0.11 *  3.07  0.35
Floor (notfinishedfloor)  -0.03  0.11  0.00  0.29 *  0.26  0.07  0.24 *  0.33  0.08
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.45 *  0.60  0.27  0.06  0.79  0.05  0.33 *  0.60  0.19
Number  of Children  -0.12 *  2.71  -0.33  -0.07 *  2.27  -0.16  -0.15 *  2.29  -0.34
Mill's  Ratio  0.48 *  3.01  1.45  0.43 *  2.39  1.03  0.43 *  2.36  1.02
Constant  -1.26  -1.26  -0.25  -0.25  -3.02 *  -3.02
Dependent  Variable
Log  Nat Expenditure  5.36  5.36  5.74  5.74  5.60  5.59
Evaluated  in pesos  212.79  212.31  310.30  310.06  269.12  268.50
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
*  Significant  at 5%,  ** Significant  at 10%
16Table 5. Household Expenditure on Educational Private Service by Povery Status
Exteme  Moderate  No Poor
Explanatory  variables  Coef.  Mean M.W.  to P.  Coef  Mean  M.W.  to P.  Coe£.  M.W.  to P.
Mean
LogNatpercapitaincome  -1.14  6.55  -7.43  0.43  7.30  3.12  0.59 *  8.52  5.02
Years of Schooling  of HH  0.22 **  5.40  1.20  -0.06 **  5.63  -0.32  0.02 *  10.96  0.19
Region  (rural)  Dropped  1.00  0.00  Dropped  1.00  0.00  -0.09  0.96  -0.08
Age  1.25 **  14.61  18.21  0.13 *  16.47  2.15  0.01  13.17  0.19
SquaredAge  -0.05 *  230.96  -12.11  0.00 *  305.14  -1.18  0.00  210.31  -0.06
Gender  0.43  0.25  0.11  0.02  0.43  0.01  0.05  0.48  0.03
Number  of rooms  0.76  3.08  2.33  0.07  2.97  0.21  -0.02  4.38  -0.09
Floor (notfinishedfloor)  -1.57 **  0.49  -0.77  -0.37 *  0.36  -0.14  0.06  0.77  0.05
Sewage  (not  sewage)  1.29  0.86  1.11  0.45 **  0.80  0.36  0.71 *  0.96  0.68
Number  of Children  -0.64  2.09  -1.33  -0.20  *  1.95  -0.39  0.00  2.00  -0.01
Mill's  Ratio  -0.57  2.18  -1.24  -0.20  1.39  -0.27  -0.02  0.77  -0.02
Constant  6.19  6.19  3.05  3.05  1.62  *  1.62
Dependent  Variable
Log Nat Expenditure  6.61  6.27  6.59  6.61  7.45  7.50
Evaluated  in pesos  745.90  528.66  726.01  740.81  1725.7  1807.44
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
*  Significant  at 5%,  ** Significant  at 10%
Table 6. Household Expenditure on Educational Public Service by Type of Education
Pre Primary  Pnnmary  Lower Secondary  Upper Secondary  Technical Education
Explanatory vaiables  Coe.  Mean  M.W. to P. Cod.  Mesn  M.W. to P. Coe  Mean  M.W. to P.  CoeE  Mean  M.W. to P.  Coef.  Mean  M.W. to P.
Log Nat per capita income  0.83  7.20  5.98  0.79  7.05  5.53  0.50  7.33  3.63  0.18  7.63  1.36  0.50  7.56  3.78
Years ofSchoolingofHH  0.02  6.14  0.10  0.01  5.40  0.07  -0.01  6.17  -0.03  -0.01  7.47  -0.06  -0.01  6.12  -0.09
Region (rural)  0.71  0.66  0.47  0.64  0.71  0.45  0.55  0.83  0.45  0.05  0.89  0.05  -0.30  0.92  -0.28
Age  -1.29  4.99  -6.45  0.07  8.91  0.62  -0.05  13.56  -0.66  -0.09  17.26  -1.49  -0.07  20.03  -1.49
Squared Age  0.13  24.93  3.19  0.00  84.08  -0.16  0.00  187.34  -0.03  0.00  311.73  0.22  0.00  449.99  0.46
Gender (female)  0.08  0.53  0.04  -0.09  0.52  -0.04  -0.01  0.53  -0.01  0.12  0.59  0.07  0.39  0.38  0.15
Numberofrooms  0.09  2.68  0.24  0.08  2.62  0.22  0.07  3.20  0.22  0.02  3.65  0.08  0.11  3.47  0.39
Floor (notfloorfinished)  0.19  0.22  0.04  0.09  0.23  0.02  0.38  0.32  0.12  0.15  0.39  0.06  -0.07  0.35  -0.03
Sewage (not sewage)  0.22  0.58  0.13  0.31  0.58  0.18  0.15  0.73  0.11  -0.04  0.83  -0.04  -0.45  0.82  -0.37
Num. Children  -0.04  1.96  -0.08  -0.10  2.45  -0.25  -0.14  2.38  -0.33  0.02  2.19  0.05  0.03  1.87  0.06
MillsRatio  0.58  2.59  1.51  0.39  2.56  0.99  0.26  2.44  0.64  -0.05  2.22  -0.11  0.03  1.75  0.06
Constant  0.22  0.22  -2.45  -2.45  1.95  1.95  6.27  6.27  3.81  3.81
Dependent Variable
Log Nat Expenditure  5.39  5.39  5.19  5.19  6.07  6.07  6.46  6.45  6.39  6.45
Evaluated inpesos  220.09  220.09  178.67  178.67  431.42  431.42  636.77  635.49  596.92  634.80
Source: Own calculations based on ENIGH 96 and DGPyP, SEP
*  Figures in bold are significant at 5%
Table 7. Household Expenditure on Educational Private Service by Type of Education
Pre Primary  Primary  LowerSecondary  Upper Secondary  Technical Education
Explanatory variables  Coef.  Mean  M.W. to P.  Cod.  Mean  M.W. to P.  Coef.  Mean  M.W. to P.  Coef.  Mean  M.W. to P.  Coe.  Mean  M.W. to P.
Log Nat per capita income  0.81  8.36  6.79  0.39  8.54  3.30  0.67  8.43  5.67  0.45  8.32  3.71  0.33  7.69  2.53
Years ofSchoolingofHH  -0.03  12.24  -0.40  0.02  11.99  0.22  -0.01  10.37  -0.06  0.03  9.54  0.28  0.01  6.47  0.10
Region (rural)  1.41  0.98  1.38  D  1.00  0.00  -0.16  0.97  -0.15  0.15  0.95  0.14  -0.16  0.93  -0.15
Age  D  5.00  0.00  0.18  8.47  1.53  -0.09  14.07  -1.27  -0.17  17.39  -2.94  -0.14  20.41  -2.85
Squared Age  D  25.00  0.00  -0.01  74.86  -0.80  0.00  207.27  0.10  0.00  309.31  0.80  0.00  452.93  1.16
Gender (female)  0.01  0.52  0.00  0.08  0.48  0.04  0.02  0.47  0.01  0.17  0.49  0.08  0.17  0.35  0.06
Numberofrooms  0.16  3.66  0.58  -0.06  4.41  -0.29  -0.04  4.37  -0.17  -0.05  4.38  -0.20  0.01  3.41  0.05
Floor (notfloorfinished)  0.17  0.71  0.12  -0.01  0.80  -0.01  -0.25  0.81  -0.20  0.00  0.75  0.00  0.02  0.40  0.01
Sewage (not sewage)  1.06  0.91  0.97  1.30  0.98  1.28  0.44  0.95  0.42  0.44  0.93  0.41  0.08  0.85  0.06
Num. Children  0.25  1.63  0.42  0.00  2.04  0.00  0.00  2.10  0.00  0.04  1.94  0.09  -0.11  2.08  -0.23
Mills Ratio  0.37  0.94  0.34  -0.32  0.96  -0.31  -0.03  0.94  -0.03  -0.19  0.76  -0.14  0.40  0.77  0.31
Constant  -2.92  -2.92  2.51  2.51  3.29  3.29  5.27  5.27  5.77  5.77
Dependent Vaiiable
LogNatExpenditure  7.21  7.29  7.44  7.46  7.50  7.60  7.48  7.49  6.74  6.83
Evaluatedinpesos  1353.7  1464.03  1699.5  1730.00  1814.2  2006.22  1776.6  1789.22  843.65  922.02
Source: Own calculations based on ENIGH 96 and DGPyP, SEP
*  Figures in bold are significant at 5%
D=vari  able dropped
17Table 8. Quantile Analysis of Household Expenditure on Educational Public Service
Quantile  regression  0.01  Quantile  regression  0.50  Quantile  regression  0.90
Explanatories  variables  Coef.  Q 0.10  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Q 0.50  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Q 0.90  M.W.  to P.
LogNat per capitaH income  0.82 *  6.27  5.11  0.72 *  7.22  5.22  0.51 *  8.17  4.14
Years  of Schooling  of HH  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 *  6.00  0.08  0.02 *  12.00  0.24
Region  (rural)  0.80 *  0.00  0.00  0.64 *  1.00  0.64  0.37 *  1.00  0.37
Age  0.16 *  6.00  0.98  0.13 *  11.00  1.44  0.12 *  16.00  1.92
Squared  Age  0.00 *  36.00  -0.13  0.00 *  121.00  -0.31  0.00 *  256.00  -0.58
Gender  (female)  0.05  0.00  0.00  -0.06 *  1.00  -0.06  0.02  1.00  0.02
Number  of rooms  0.06 *  1.00  0.06  0.09 *  3.00  0.28  0.07 *  5.00  0.33
Floor  (notfinishedfloor)  0.43 *  0.00  0.00  0.21 *  0.00  0.00  0.13 *  1.00  0.13
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.42 *  0.00  0.00  0.22 *  1.00  0.22  0.14 *  1.00  0.14
Number  of Children  -0.02  1.00  -0.02  -0.11 *  2.00  -0.23  -0.  11 *  4.00  -0.44
Mill's Ratio  0.59 *  1.30  0.77  0.41 *  2.45  1.01  0.22 *  3.68  0.81
Constant  -5.35 *  -5.35  -2.28 *  -2.28  1.00 *  1.00
Dependent  Variable
Log  Nat Expenditure  4.01  1.42  5.79  6.01  6.98  8.08
Evaluated  in pesos  54.91  4.13  326.44  409.05  1075.65  3224.26
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
* Significant  at 5%,  ** Significant  at 10%
Table 9. Quantile Analysis of Household Expenditure on Educational Private Service
Quantile  regression  0.01  Quantile  regression  0.50  Quantile  regression  0.90
Explanatories  variables  Coef.  Q 0.10  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Q 0.50  M.W.  to P.  Coef.  Q 0.90  MLW.  to P.
Log  Nat per capita  H income  0.50 *  7.24  3.64  0.53 *  8.30  4.39  0.72 *  9.40  6.79
Years of Schooling  of HH  0.04 *  3.00  0.13  0.03 *  9.00  0.25  0.00  16.50  0.00
Region  (rural)  -0.27  1.00  -0.27  -0.18  1.00  -0.18  0.35  1.00  0.35
Age  0.10 *  6.00  0.58  0.03 *  14.00  0.44  0.00  20.00  0.08
Squared  Age  0.00 *  36.00  -0.11  0.00 *  196.00  -0.17  0.00  400.00  0.02
Gender (female)  -0.10  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.10  1.00  0.10
Number  of rooms  -0.04  2.00  -0.08  0.03  4.00  0.10  0.01  6.00  0.06
Floor (notfinishedfloor)  -0.12  0.00  0.00  0.03  1.00  0.03  0.15  1.00  0.15
Sewage  (not  sewage)  0.71 *  1.00  0.71  0.39 *  1.00  0.39  -0.16  1.00  -0.16
Number  of Children  0.09  1.00  0.09  -0.06  2.00  -0.11  -0.02  3.00  -0.06
Mill's Ratio  -0.06  0.17  -0.01  0.06  0.75  0.05  -0.03  1.71  -0.06
Constant  0.94  0.94  2.09 *  2.09  1.93  *  1.93
Dependent  Variable
LogNatExpenditure  6.13  5.62  7.31  7.28  8.61  9.20
Evaluated  in pesos  460.01  275.37  1497.22  1445.25  5490.24  9883.40
Source:  Own calculations  based  on ENIGH  96 and DGPyP,  SEP
*  Significant  at 5%,  **  Significant  at 10%
18APPENDIX  3 QUANTILE  REGRESSION MODELS
This kind of regression model has some desirable characteristics, especially when
one is interested in the analysis of certain variable throughout its distribution. The main
features of the quantile regression models can be summarized as follows:
i)  The model can be used to characterize the entire conditional distribution of the
dependent variable;
ii)  The  quantile  regression  objective  function  is  a  weighted  sum  of  absolute
deviations,  which  gives  a  robust  measure  of  location,  so  that  the  estimated
coefficient vector is non sensitive to outlier observations of dependent variable;
iii)  When the error term is non-normnal,  quantile regression estimators may be more
efficient than least squares estimators; and,
iv)  Different solutions at distinct quantiles may be interpreted  as differences in the
responses of the dependent variable to changes in the independent variables at
various  points  in  the  conditional  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable  [see
Buchinsky (1998)].
Assume  that  earnings,  or  other  monetary  variable,  (Yi) depends  on  a  set  of
independent variables Xi, such as that function can be written  as a  quantile regression.
Then, we have
log Yi = Xi3  + po
with  Quanto (log YilX 1 =  X,io  (i= 1,...,n)
Where fl9  and Xi are Kxl  vectors, and X,-=1;
Quanto (log YhA)  denotes the Oth  conditional quantile of Ygiven X;
Also letfp,  mX) denote the density of uo given X [it follows that Quant(,au&.X)=O].
Note that the Xi vector may include a set of explanatory dummy variables as well as some
controls. For an extensive review see Buchinsky (1994).
19APPENDIX4. DECOMPOSITIONOF  THE  FACTORS  THATDETERMINE  ENROLLMENT
Table 1. Determinants of Upper Secondary School Enrollment
Full Sample  Poorest 40%  Richest 40%  Urban  Rural
Variables  Marginal Level  Marginal  Level  Marginal Level  Marginal Level  Marginal Level
Effect  Sign.  Effect  Sign.  Effect  sign.  effect  sign.  Effect  sign.
Individuals  Characteristics
Age  0.78  0.02  1.58  0.01  0.08  0.85  0.43  0.21  1.44  0.04
Age Square  -0.03  0.01  -0.05  0.00  -0.01  0.67  -0.02  0.12  -0.05  0.03
Female Gender  -0.02  0.39  -0.04  0.30  -0.02  0.45  -0.02  0.41  0.00  0.98
Head of Household (HH) Characteristics
HH Age  0.02  0.00  .0.01  0.40  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.08
HH Age square  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.09
HH female gender  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.32  0.06  0.09  0.02  0.52  0.24  0.00
HH Some Primary  -0.06  0.06  -0.12  0.02  0.03  0.58  -0.01  0.84  -0.22  0.00
HH Primary complete  0.05  0.14  0.01  0.90  0.10  0.03  0.05  0.14  -0.04  0.58
HH L-Secondary complete  0.16  0.00  0.10  0.19  0.15  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.03  0.77
HH U-Secondary or higher  0.29  0.00  0.32  0.01  0.26  0.00  0.26  0.00  0.33  0.09
Agriculture/Mining  0.04  0.61  -0.28  0.06  0.14  0.09  0.08  0.30  -0.17  0.38
Manufacturing  -0.12  0.00  -0.14  0.04  -0.08  0.10  0.04  0.44  -0.13  0.10
Utilities  -0.03  0.41  0.01  0.90  -0.01  0.88  -0.01  0.71  -0.14  0.18
Commerce  0.00  0.92  -0.12  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.03  0.54  -0.08  0.44
Transports/Communications  0.01  0.85  0.03  0.69  0.04  0.33  0.03  0.33  -0.11  0.28
Financial Services  -0.01  0.83  0.02  0.83  0.06  0.21  0.00  0.97  -0.05  0.75
Services  -0.03  0.78  -0.33  0.22  0.09  0.45  -0.02  0.89  -0.09  0.79
Agricultural Worker  0.03  0.53  -0.02  0.80  0.17  0.02  0.05  0.50  -0.09  0.29
Business Owner  0.04  0.29  0.24  0.01  -0.10  0.04  0.05  0.23  0.04  0.65
Self Employed  0.03  0.69  -0.22  0.17  0.14  0.08  0.05  0.55  -0.02  0.92
Formal worker  0.02  0.77  -0.20  0.21  0.11  0.31  0.03  0.66  -0.03  0.88
Dwelling Characteristics
Electrified  -0.03  0.60  -0.01  0.95  -0.11  0.34  -0.13  0.10  0.08  0.38
Sewage  0.07  0.00  0.08  0.05  0.12  0,01  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.13
Family Characteristics
Number of babies  -0.06  0.02  -0.02  0.58  -0.18  0.00  -0.05  0.13  -0.04  0.40
Number of babies square  0.01  0.56  -0.01  0.58  0.06  0.02  0.00  1.00  0.01  0.67
Number of children  0.03  0.15  0.04  0.34  0.04  0.25  0.01  0.56  0.08  0.09
Numberofchildrensquare  -0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.10  -0.01  0.31  -0.01  0.17  -0.02  0.05
Number of Adults  0.01  0.73  0.06  0.41  -0.01  0.75  -0.01  0.86  0.08  0.39
Number of Adults square  0.00  0.30  -0.01  0.14  0.00  0.86  0.00  0.62  -0.01  0.20
HH income per capita  0.05  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.88
Government Effort
Teachers per 1000 15-19  years  0.07  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.02  0.52  0.03  0.19  0.25  0.00
old  population
Federal Expenditure  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.93  0.00  0.04
Source:  Own  calculation  based  on ENIGH  96
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